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THE ROLE OF TRUST IN MAINTAINING THE RESILIENCE OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
Professor Roman Tomasic and Dr Folarin Akinbami* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) threatened to bring world financial markets to a halt. It is now 
coming to light that in the run-up to, and at the height of, the GFC, investment banks and other 
participants in the financial markets acted unethically as well as imprudently. This article takes a 
closer look at this unethical behaviour and the way in which it constitutes a failure of trust. The 
article defines trust and outlines why it is important in the regulation of financial markets. It then 
looks at three examples of breakdowns or failures of trust in the run-up to the financial crisis. The 
article concludes by arguing that trust is important in commercial relationships at both the intra-firm 
level (the relations between the different constituents of the firm) and the inter-firm level (the 
relations between the firm and other firms). 
KEY WORDS: Trust, Global Financial Crisis, progressive corporate law, financial innovation, moral 
hazard, too big to fail, creative accounting  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This article is concerned with the prevention and control of abuse and self-dealing in the financial 
sector. Our aim here is to examine the role that trust plays in financial markets, and in so doing, to 
consider some crucial background factors that could  lay the foundation for effective counter-
measures against abuse and self-dealing in the financial sector. There is already much academic 
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literature on the role of trust in product markets,1 labour markets2 and intra-firm relations.3 This 
article reviews this literature and aims to provide similar analysis and insight with relation to 
financial markets. It also looks at the role that trust (or lack of it) played in the global financial crisis 
that began in late 2007. 
 
One of the most important elements of financial markets, which help to make those markets 
possible, is the existence of trust between those who operate in such markets. It has been argued by 
business leaders that trying to write good contracts with bad people simply does not work.4 The 
importance of trustworthiness applies especially to the major financial organisations and 
professionals that constitute the market. This includes the internal cultures of these organisations as 
well as the wider social context in which these organisations operate. To this extent, we should 
distinguish between the role played by trust in intra-firm relationships (relationships between 
different members or stakeholders in a corporation) and inter-firm relationships (the relationships 
between a corporation and outsiders who transact with it). 
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Part A of the article introduces some key issues that will be dealt with in the article. Part B provides 
an explanation of what trust is and discusses the importance of both intra-firm and inter-firm trust. 
It also highlights how important trust is in financial markets in general. Part C illustrates the 
problems that can occur when there are breakdowns of trust in financial markets.  It outlines some 
key developments in the run-up to the GFC. It then discusses three examples of breakdowns of trust 
(and their effects) in the run-up to the GFC. Part D brings together the different strands of the article 
to a conclusion.  
 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
In order to carry out a meaningful analysis of trust in the financial markets it is important to first try 
to understand what trust means. It has been defined as “a reasonable belief that trusted persons will 
tell the truth, and keep their promises”.5 It has also been defined as “the expectation that arises 
within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared 
norms, on the part of other members of that community”.6 One definition of trust that is particularly 
relevant to the discussion of trust in financial markets is as “faith or confidence in the loyalty, 
strength, veracity...of a person or thing...without examination”.7 This definition is relevant to 
financial markets because it shows the link between trust and confidence.8 The two words will not 
always be inter-changeable, but they are clearly linked, and references to collapses in confidence in 
financial markets are, to a large extent, akin to breakdowns of trust. A bank run may be seen as a 
stark illustration of a lack of trust in banks on the part of bank depositors. 
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1. The role of ‘trust’ in the relationships within the firm (intra-firm trust) 
Conservative contractarians view corporations as a ‘nexus of contracts’, that is, an aggregate of 
various inputs acting together to produce goods or services.9 To them the firm is a legal fiction 
because it is not really an entity, but is instead a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts 
establishing rights and obligations among the various inputs making the firm, namely, the 
shareholders, creditors, employees and management.10 They therefore view corporate law as 
consisting of default rules rather than mandatory ones.11 They view corporate rules as a substitute 
for private bargaining, that is, as contractual terms that have not yet been put into the contract.12 
On this basis, they are unsympathetic to notions such as trust, ethics, morality or fiduciary duties. 
 
Progressive corporate law scholars hold the opposite view to contractarians. They argue that human 
beings do not behave in the strictly individualistic and self-interested manner that economic models 
often imply, and that trust is central to relationships within firms.13 This is because a firm is not just 
an economic or a political institution, but also a social one as well.14 They argue that commercial or 
economic relationships are about more than just the pursuit of self-interest using calculative means- 
the fact that they are also social relationships means that they require trust in order to flourish, and 
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that this trust gives them deeper human meaning.15 They even go as far as to argue that when 
human beings are trusted they become encouraged to behave in a more trustworthy manner.16 
Progressive corporate law scholars are supported by the literature in psychology and sociology 
which argues that economic motivation is much more complex and encompasses much broader 
social habits and mores.17 Fukuyama, for example, argues that commerce is about more than just 
money and profit- economic life is deeply embedded in social life, and it cannot be understood apart 
from the customs, morals and habits (culture) of the society in which it occurs.18 
  
The debate between contractarians and progressives is, in essence, about the difference between an 
economic environment where contracts prevail (calculativeness) and one where social responsibility, 
ethics and fiduciary duties prevail (trust). This dichotomy does not just apply to the relationships 
within a firm, but can also apply to the firm’s relationships with outsiders. It certainly applies to the 
relationships between trading entities in the financial markets, and raises questions such as whether 
we should see financial markets merely as contracts-based markets or whether markets have a 
social character, leading us to impose “other-regarding” duties, such as fiduciary duties on some 
financial market participants.  This is however a debate that is beyond the scope of this article. 
 
2. The role of ‘trust’ in commercial relationships (inter-firm trust) 
The relevance of trust in commercial relationships has generated a significant amount of debate in 
economic and corporate law circles. On the one hand, law and economics scholars and conservative 
contractarians place less emphasis on trust and more emphasis on the ‘rational economic man’ 
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model that is associated with neo-classical economics, while on the other hand,   socio-legal  
scholars place much greater  emphasis on the role of trust. 
 
Law and economics scholars generally view individuals as rational utility maximisers, that is, as 
autonomous individuals who make rational choices that maximise their satisfactions.19  Economists 
like Oliver Williamson argue that if individuals are rational utility maximisers then they must take a 
calculative approach in their economic interactions or commercial transactions.20  For them, trust is 
only used in personal relations.21 They further argue that economic interactions are based on risk 
rather than trust, and that economic actors deal with risk using calculative approaches, such as 
contracts22 and credible commitments,23 to anticipate and allocate risk. It must be said here that 
rational utility maximising theory (or Rational Choice Theory, as it is popularly known) is not without 
its critics.24 
 
Socio-legal scholarship offers a contrasting view of trust to that of law and economics scholarship. 
Accounts of trust in terms of personal or social factors portray trust as having social, moral, ethical 
and cultural values rather than being based on rationality, self-interest or contract.25 According to 
them trust plays a significant role in shaping the firm’s inter-firm dealings, that is, its dealings with 
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other firms. It has been argued, for example, that building trust between organisations is important 
because trust enhances business performance,26 and trust is an important component in the success 
of partnerships, strategic alliances and networks of small firms.27  
 
It has, however, been argued that this dichotomy is far too strongly drawn- the argument is that 
both calculative or self-interest accounts of trust, on the one hand, and the social notions of trust, 
on the other hand, neglect the role of institutional forms , including contract law, in sustaining and 
reproducing trust.28 This is because both accounts of trust marginalise explanations based on 
institutional form.29 Institutional trust (system trust) refers to the wider institutional and 
organisational framework within which inter-firm and personal relationships are formed.30 The 
benefit of having institutions is that they allow firms to form and extend relationships with greater 
confidence and effect.31 
 
It has also been argued that the building of trust through individual relationships and inter-
organisational links cannot be seen in isolation from the institutional framework within which 
contracts are made and performed.32 Therefore the influence of the legal system needs to be 
understood in the context of other institutional factors, especially the activities of industry-level 
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trade associations and standard-setting organisations.33 This is because these intermediate 
institutions, along with norms such as the norm of ‘good faith’, play an important role in the process 
through which the values, ethics or principles of the legal system come to be translated into the 
notions of business ethics or the more concrete terms of standard form agreements. 34 
 
3. The Importance of ‘trust’ in financial markets in particular 
It has been argued that trust is important in commercial relationships because it is crucial to the 
health of the financial system and the economy.35 This is, in part, because it helps investors by 
providing a fairly easy and inexpensive way to help them decide whether or not to buy shares or 
other securities, and whether or not to enter into commercial relationships.36 Lynn Stout has argued 
that rather than being ‘rational expectations investors’, investors by and large tend to be ‘trusting 
investors’.37 This is because investors would find it far too difficult to be rational expectations 
investors- it would take up too much of their time and effort to act in this way, and would probably 
cost them too much money.38 This means that, in truth, investors use ‘trust’ as a sort of heuristic. 
This explains investors’ reliance on gatekeepers such as accountants (auditors), lawyers, credit rating 
agencies and investment analysts, to endorse what corporations and other securities issuers claim. 
Stout further argues that in order to maintain a large and thriving public securities market it is 
important that we pay attention to the needs of the ‘trusting investor’.39 It is therefore clear that we 
must pay attention to ‘trust’ issues if we want investors to continue investing in securities and other 
financial products and services.  
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Trust is relevant in both wholesale and retail financial markets. Some banking and finance scholars 
have highlighted the importance of trust and confidence with regard to decision-making by 
consumers of financial services, seeking to evaluate financial products as they seek to make sense of 
complex and uncertain financial product information. Gray and Hamilton, for example, argue that 
emotions such as trust and confidence are significant influences on decision-making, because 
consumers find it difficult to evaluate the risks associated with financial services products.40 They 
further argue that such reliance on trust and confidence parallels the shift, in contract theory, 
towards the recognition of relational contracting, where concepts such as trust and cooperation play 
an important role in characterising the relationship between the parties.41 Bank deposits are another 
area where trust is important- the Bank of England has argued that the relationships between banks 
and their depositors require a strong element of trust because bank deposits are supposed to be 
“unsecured, capital-certain” claims.42 Campbell and Cartwright argue that “the fragility of the 
financial system, built as it is on confidence, can mean that there is a real possibility of systemic risk 
spreading throughout the system”.43 Banks can therefore be regarded as special because they are 
part of a fragile system as evidenced by their susceptibility to bank runs and panics, their functions in 
regard to the money supply and their particular role in maintaining the payment system.44 This is 
what necessitates satisfactory depositor protection arrangements as part of any effective bank 
regulation regime.45 
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C. THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF BREAKDOWNS OF TRUST IN 
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
It is clear that trust plays an important role in relationships within the firm and in the firm’s 
commercial relationships with other firms and individuals. This section will, first of all, outline some 
key developments in the run-up to and during the GFC.  The GFC provides a good example of what 
can happen when there is a complete breakdown of trust in financial markets. After looking at the 
GFC the section goes on to highlight three examples of breakdowns of trust in the run-up to the GFC. 
These examples further illustrate how important trust is in finance, and why breakdowns of trust are 
undesirable in financial markets. The first example is the collapse of Northern Rock, which clearly 
shows how failures of trust can have a detrimental effect on a banks’ ability to raise funds through 
the inter-bank markets and through deposits from retail depositors. It is thus an illustration of 
breakdowns in inter-firm trust. The second example is the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and it 
provides a strong example of how self-dealing and abuse can contribute to breakdowns of trust 
between the members of a firm. It also illustrates how such abuse and self-dealing can lead to 
breakdowns of trust between the firm and other firms. It therefore illustrates breakdowns of both 
intra-firm and inter-firm trust. The third example is the recent scandal regarding Goldman Sachs’ 
role in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 (ABACUS) transaction. It is an example of a breakdown in inter-firm 
trust and it illustrates the detrimental effect that abuses of trust can have on a firm’s relationships 
with other firms in the market. The GFC and the three examples will be discussed below. 
 
1. The Global Financial Crisis 
Some accounts of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) describe its origins as an asset price bubble in the 
US and UK housing markets, caused largely by deregulatory measures, benign macro-economic 
conditions, the reckless use of financial innovation, excessive liquidity and the easy availability of 
11 
 
credit.46   Deregulatory measures have been highlighted as the catalyst in the build-up to the GFC.47 
Excessive liquidity and misuse of financial innovation led to a significant deterioration of risk controls 
for the extension of credit, and subsequently to excessive lowering of underwriting standards for 
sub-prime mortgages.48 This, along with market euphoria and irrational exuberance among 
investors, contributed to the real estate asset price bubble, which in large part triggered the 
financial crisis when it eventually burst.49 
 
The misuse of financial innovation was reflected in  the adoption by banks  of the originate-to-
distribute business  model, whereby banks re-package the loans they had advanced to customers 
into marketable securities, known as Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), that can be traded on global 
capital markets.50 The main forms of ABS used were Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) 
and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs). These financial innovations (RMBS and CDOs) became a 
significant part of commercial and investment banking- they provided a source of finance for new 
loans as well as an avenue of investment for the banks themselves (who bought CDOS as well as 
selling them), hedge funds, pension funds and other financial institutions. The ABS were particularly 
attractive investments for these banks and investors because regulations, such as Basel II, compelled 
                                                          
46
 F Akinbami, “The Global Financial Crisis: Causes, Effects and Issues to Consider in the Reform of Financial 
Regulation” in M D McKenzie and S K Kim (eds) International Banking in the New Era: Post-Crisis Challenges 
and Opportunities (International Finance Review 11) (Bingley, Emerald Publishing, 2010) 167, 169-170; S 
Jagger, “Sub-prime and Banking Crisis: Who Caused this Nightmare? The Blame Spreads”, The Times, 19 March 
2008 
47
 R Tomasic, Beyond ‘Light Touch’ Regulation of British Banks After the Financial Crisis” in I MacNeil and J 
O’Brien (eds.), The Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010); J C Coffee, “What Went 
Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis” (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 1, 4; Testimony of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox before the Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, US Senate, 23 September 2008 
48
 E Avgouleas, “The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New 
Orthodoxy” (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 23, 34-35 
49
 R J Shiller, The Sub-prime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to do About It 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008); R J Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2
nd
 edn., 2005)  
50
 For more on the originate-to-distribute model see A E Wilmarth, “The Dark Side of Universal Banking: 
Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis” (2009) 41 Connecticut Law Review 
963, 995-996 
12 
 
them to invest in only Triple A rated assets.51 Unknown to these institutional investors the sheer 
complexity of these financial innovations, coupled with conflicts of interest affecting the major credit 
rating agencies, led the credit rating agencies to erroneously grant Triple A ratings to securities (ABS) 
that were less than worthy of such ratings.52 
 
The asset price bubble that preceded the GFC has been described as “a supply-driven bubble, fuelled 
by the fact that mortgage loan originators came to realise that underwriters were willing to buy 
portfolios of mortgage loans for asset-backed securitisations without any serious investigation of the 
underlying collateral”.53 In effect, they ‘trusted’ the mortgage loan originators to only originate 
decent loans and therefore they did not bother to ‘verify’ the ‘decency’ of those loans. Such ‘trust’ is 
misplaced when the originators are not the ones who will bear the loss (costs) for not doing the 
proper screening of those to whom the mortgages have been granted, in effect generating a sort of 
moral hazard.54  
 
The bursting of the asset price bubble led to huge numbers of defaults of sub-prime mortgages. 
These sub-prime mortgages were part of the structured credit products that were developed under 
the originate-to-distribute model (RMBS and CDOs) and therefore the losses associated with the US 
sub-prime mortgage defaults spread to the banks, hedge funds and other capital market investors 
who were the main buyers of RMBS, CDOs and other such ABS.55 This wiped out the demand for 
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these structured credit products in the capital markets, since the fear of hidden RMBS and CDO 
liabilities led to investors becoming wary of purchasing such products.56 
 
Banks and insurance companies that invested heavily in these structured credit products suffered 
huge losses, and subsequently saw their market capitalisations fall dramatically as their share prices 
tumbled. The investment banks most heavily involved in the structured credit business actually 
collapsed. The losses and falls in market capitalisations were so severe that three of the five large US 
investment banks had to be rescued57 or became insolvent,58 while the two Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs) that specialised in structured finance,59 and the largest US insurance company,60 
all had to be bailed out, at substantial cost to the US taxpayer. The most notable of these companies 
that suffered financial difficulties is Lehman Brothers (hereinafter, Lehman), which, at that time, was 
the fourth largest US investment bank. 
 
Lehman, like other investment banks used a highly leveraged business strategy. The US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) had no authority to force investment banks to reduce their 
leverage,61 and as a result, debt financing rose greatly in comparison to equity financing. The 
reliance on leverage financing became so widespread as a result partly of competitive pressure and 
the desire to gain strong market share.62 Excessive leverage has been identified as one of a number 
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of bank practices that contributed to the GFC.63 The use of leverage is problematic because of its 
inverse relationship with liquidity- during the process of credit expansion the financial system 
becomes progressively illiquid.64 Increasing leverage therefore makes a firm less financially robust, 
and when a highly leveraged firm sustains losses beyond a certain level this will sharply reduce its 
ability to pay its debts.65 This is because it is more likely to be hit by a loss spiral, whereby a decline 
in the value of its assets erodes its net worth much faster than its gross worth because of its 
leverage and the limited amount that it can borrow falls.66 The upshot of this is that when a firm is 
highly leveraged a collapse of trust or confidence by its creditors or investors can quickly take it from 
being illiquid to being insolvent.   
 
The collapse of Lehman was particularly significant for a number of reasons. The most significant of 
these is that it proved to be the tipping point, in which a credit crunch and loss of confidence in 
some financial firms, transformed into a full-blown systemic financial crisis.67 It is also significant 
because Lehman was the only financial firm that failed to secure privately or publicly funded 
financial assistance- it ultimately had to file for corporate bankruptcy. The decision by the US 
authorities to allow Lehman to fail represents the prioritising of concerns about moral hazard over 
and above concerns that troubled institutions that are too big to fail can trigger systemic crises if 
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they are not rescued. This decision has, however, been criticised as incorrect because the collapse of 
Lehman had such a catastrophic effect on the global financial system.68 
 
(a) Lessons from the GFC 
The GFC has shown how important liquidity is to the financial system. It has also shown that liquidity 
is largely dependent on trust. When confidence (trust) was eroded, liquidity disappeared. The 
erosion of confidence was signified by, for example, the collapse of confidence in RMBS and CDOs. 
The use, by investment banks such as Lehman, of a high-risk, high-leverage business model requires 
the maintenance of the trust of all the counterparties that they deal with- it has been said that with 
such a business model “confidence is critical”.69 This is because counterparties put themselves in a 
vulnerable position in relation to the investment bank, based on the understanding that they will be 
able to reclaim all funds due to them under their counterparty agreements. A bank or investment 
bank that knowingly and recklessly puts itself in a position where it could potentially be unable to 
fulfil its financial obligations to its counterparties will lose the trust of its counterparties.  
 
Another lesson to be drawn from the GFC is the fallibility of reputational or trust intermediaries such 
as gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries who provide verification and 
certification services to investors, essentially doing what investors cannot easily do for themselves.70 
They, in effect, assure investors of their trustworthiness and reliability by pledging the “reputational 
capital” that they have developed over many years so that   investors recognise that no individual 
                                                          
68
 D W Arner, “The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences (2009) 43 International Lawyer 101, 
141; H Samuel and H Wallop, Financial Crisis: Christine Lagarde Warned Hank Paulson to Bail Out Lehman 
Brothers, The Daily Telegraph, 16 October 2008;  J Tibman, The Murder of Lehman Brothers: An Insider’s Look 
at the Global Meltdown (New York, Brick Tower Press, 2009), 177, 194-195 
69
 In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, US Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, Volume 
1 (2009) (hereafter Bankruptcy Report), 3 
70
 See Coffee supra n 47, 1; J C Coffee, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2006) 
16 
 
corporate client could pay the gatekeeper enough to compensate it fully for the loss of reputational 
capital that it would suffer from association with a major scandal.71 Typical examples of gatekeepers 
include auditors, securities analysts and credit rating agencies. Investors place their trust in the 
gatekeeper, thus putting the gatekeeper in a powerful position in relation to these investors.   
 
The gatekeepers (in this case the credit rating agencies (CRAs)) failed in their gatekeeping duties 
because they suffered from conflicts of interest.72 The increased use of financial innovation 
(particularly structured finance) produced a change in the relationships between the ratings 
agencies and their clients- structured finance became the rating agencies’ leading source of revenue, 
since rating securitised offerings generated much higher fees73 and the increased competition in the 
CRA industry,  when it changed from a duopoly (with Standard and Poors and Moodys) to one 
comprised of three CRAs (after the entrance of Fitch), made the competitors not more faithful to 
investors, but more dependent on their immediate clients, the issuers of the structured finance 
products.74 In essence, the increased use of financial innovation, coupled with increased competition 
within the CRA industry, made the CRAs more beholden to the banks and other structured finance 
securities issuers. 
 
The realisation that credit ratings were flawed led to the massive withdrawal of liquidity from the 
capital markets- investors were no longer willing to rely on ratings and, being unable to perform 
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their own credit analyses, withdrew from a wide range of structured finance markets.75 This clearly 
illustrates how trust is crucial in order for capital markets to function properly. The pre-eminence of 
gatekeepers was a result of the fact that they were trusted. As a result of their failure to carry out 
their gate-keeping role effectively they were no longer respected, and the debate on how best to 
regulate them has intensified. It has, for example, been proposed that rather than merely relying on 
their reputations as a check on gatekeepers, such as CRAs, we might have to do this through either 
civil action76 or regulation.77 Regardless of which of these two approaches is adopted it is clear that 
something needs to be done about the CRAs as it is no longer enough to simply rely on their 
reputations to be an effective check on how they behave and manage the conflicts of interest that 
they face. 
 
2. The collapse of Northern Rock 
The fall in the demand for ABS and other Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) contributed to the 
collapse of Northern Rock, a bank in the UK that funded its mortgage book largely through the sales 
of ABCP on the global capital markets. The failure of the interbank markets and the seizing up of 
interbank lending in August and September 2007 caused severe liquidity problems for Northern 
Rock, which had not foreseen the possibility of all of its funding markets closing simultaneously.78 
Northern Rock was much more affected by the drying up of funds in the capital markets than other 
UK banks because it relied much more than the other UK banks on capital market funding rather 
than on retail deposit funding- its business strategy has been described as reckless and high-risk 
because it over-relied on short and medium-term wholesale funding from the capital markets and 
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because it failed to take out adequate insurance for the problems that it faced.79 The bank suffered a 
run by its depositors and ultimately had to be nationalised. The failure of Northern Rock illustrates 
what can happen when trading entities lose trust in each other. It suffered the run because the 
bank-customer relationship is based on trust, and this trust disappeared once it came to light that 
the bank’s business strategy was flawed. The failure of Northern Rock also shows how the inter-bank 
market and capital markets are also based on trust. Banks rely on the inter-bank market to fund day-
to-day operations, and if this funding is withdrawn they can get into serious trouble.80 It is, 
therefore, important that banks and other financial institutions do everything within their power to 
maintain the trust reposed in them.  
 
3. The collapse of Lehman Brothers 
The collapse of Lehman was a very significant event in the GFC. Prior to its demise Lehman was the 
fourth largest investment bank in the US.81 It used a high-risk, high leverage business model that was 
based on maintaining the confidence of its counterparties- if these counterparties were to lose 
confidence in Lehman and decline to roll over its daily funding in the short term repo markets then 
Lehman would be unable to fund itself and unable to continue its operations .82 To this extent it 
operated a business model that relied on high levels of trust on the part of its counterparties. 
 
In 2006 Lehman embarked on an aggressive growth strategy, taking on significantly greater risk and 
substantially increasing its leverage.83 In doing so, it repeatedly exceeded its own internal risk limits 
and controls.84 This reckless approach to leverage and risk management represents a failure by the 
firm’s senior management to run the firm appropriately and in the best, long-term interests of its 
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investors, particularly its shareholders. Such failures can have a detrimental effect on trust in 
financial markets. 
 
(a) Fraud and the issuing of Alt-A Loans 
Lehman engaged in the business of non-prime loans; it was also heavily involved in the sub-prime 
loans business.85 In addition, it was heavily involved in the Alt-A loans business and even had a 
subsidiary, Aurora LLC, which specialised in such mortgages.86 Alt-A loans are not prime loans, but 
are supposed to be less risky than sub-prime loans.87 These loans have been referred to as liar’s 
loans.88 Such loans increase adverse selection89 and are allegedly ‘criminogenic’, because they 
encourage mortgage fraud by creating strong incentives to provide false information on loan 
applications.90  This combination of adverse selection and mortgage fraud gives Alt-A loans a highly 
negative expected value and can easily lead to significant losses for the lender or underwriter.91 
 
 In the short-term, writing large quantities of Alt-A loans creates the misleading impression that the 
company or firm is making significant profits, but such profits turn out, in the long run, to be illusory, 
since the company suffers huge losses in the future when the Alt-A loans begin to default. The short-
term appearance of profitability encourages the firms’ managers to take a short-termist view since 
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their remuneration is based on short-term profits.92 It therefore becomes in the managers’ interest 
to make (and to conceal the potential future losses from) such loans, even though making such loans 
is totally contrary to shareholders’ long-term interests. In this way, Lehman activity in the Alt-A loan 
market illustrates the classic ‘agency’ problem, as illustrated by Berle and Means, whereby the 
separation of the ownership of the firm from its controllers leads to situations where the interests of 
the owners (shareholders) and the controllers (managers) diverge.93  
 
The so-called “agency problem” highlights the need for trust between the internal members of a 
firm. A large investment bank such as Lehman would have a diffused and diversified shareholder 
base, as well as several employees. This diverse body of shareholders entrust their property, the 
firm, to the management of the firm. In turn, the management is expected to run the firm in the best 
long term interests of the shareholders. The managers, as fiduciaries, must therefore put the long-
term business interest of the firm ahead of its short-term profitability, and ought to manage the 
firm’s risk profile accordingly. To the extent that the Lehman management failed to do this, it 
represents a failure of the trust placed in them by Lehman’s shareholders.  
 
(b) Lehman’s Use of Repo 105 and Repo 108 
Like many others in the banking and finance industry, Lehman required favourable ratings from the 
principal rating agencies in order to maintain investor and counterparty confidence, and to do this it 
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had to report favourable net leverage numbers to maintain its ratings and confidence.94 It therefore 
decided to paint a misleading picture of its financial condition - it used creative accounting to give 
the impression that it had a strong and robust liquidity pool, when in fact it did not.95 This again 
represents a significant failure of trust. In so doing Lehman’s senior management behaved in a way 
that had the potential to reduce the trust placed in Lehman by the firm’s shareholders (intra-firm 
trust) and other investors and counterparties (inter-firm trust). 
 
In late 2007 and all through 2008 Lehman increasingly used accounting devices, known within 
Lehman as Repo 105 and Repo 108, to temporarily remove billions of dollars of securities inventory 
from its balance sheet.96 Repo 105 and 108 were similar to standard repurchase and resale (repo) 
transactions97 used by investment banks to secure short-term financing but had one critical 
difference: Lehman accounted for Repo 105 and 108 transactions as ‘sales’ rather than financing 
transactions - a re-characterisation that removed such inventory from its balance sheet.98 Lehman 
never publicly disclosed its use of Repo 105 and 108 transactions, its accounting treatment for these 
transactions or the material impact these transactions had on its publicly reported net leverage 
ratio.99 In fact, it categorically declared, in its financial statement, that it treated all repo transactions 
as financing transactions (i.e. not sales) for financial reporting purposes.100 Lehman’s Bankruptcy 
Examiner concluded that some of Lehman’s officers breached their fiduciary duties by exposing 
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Lehman to potential liability for filing materially misleading periodic reports.101 It thus clearly 
represents a situation where ‘trusted persons’ were seen to have abused the trust reposed in them.  
 
The use of Repo 105 and 108 was problematic because it seemed to have had no other purpose than 
to deceive investors and regulators.  It has been argued that accounting approaches used to achieve 
GAAP accounting  treatments that are contrary to the true nature (or the economic substance) of 
the transaction are deceitful.102 Former insiders at Lehman have acknowledged that the only 
purpose or motive for the transactions was reduction in the balance sheet and that there was no 
substance to the transactions.103 They referred to the transactions as “an accounting gimmick” and 
as “balance sheet window-dressing based on legal technicalities”.104 Repo 105 and 108 therefore 
amounted to what has been referred to as “non-disclosing disclosure”, whereby “all the relevant 
information is provided, but in such a way that it is almost impossible to realise it might raise 
questions for the accounting treatment used”.105 It has even been argued that regulators and law 
enforcement officials prefer to tackle out-and-out frauds (which are easier to prosecute) than 
creative accounting (which is harder to prosecute), and that this affected the enforcement response 
to the corporate governance failures at Enron so it focused only  on fraud and criminal prosecutions 
(because they are easier to secure convictions) thereby failing to provide a definitive response to  
‘gaming the system’ through the use of creative accounting.106 
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The use of creative accounting, such as Repo 105 and 108, to conceal short-comings represents a 
failure of the trust that shareholders, employees (intra-firm trust) and creditors (inter-firm trust) 
placed in the firm’s management. Such esoteric accounting treatments bear similarities to the sort of 
creative accounting that was at the heart of breaches of trust by the managers of Enron, and 
ultimately contributed to its downfall. The problem with such creative accounting is that it helps 
managements conceal short-comings in corporate performance, thus contributing to the downfall of 
companies.107 It also raises serious issues regarding the reliability of financial reporting - it has been 
pointed out, for instance, that part of the outrage felt after the Enron collapse was simply the result 
of the fact that Enron used creative accounting to fundamentally mislead the market.108 What this 
illustrates is that from the point of view of shareholders and investors, who place themselves in a 
vulnerable position by trusting the managers of the firm, the central concern is not whether the 
financial reports comply with the technical aspects of the law. It is, instead, whether or not the 
financial reports can be relied on, that is, the extent to which they can trust that such reports are an 
accurate portrayal of the firm’s true position. 
 
4. Goldman Sachs, Paulson hedge fund, ACA, IKB and ABN transactions 
This episode involved the structuring of a CDO transaction known as ABACUS by Goldman Sachs, and 
its marketing and sale to the German corporate finance bank IKB and the Belgian-Dutch bank ABN 
Amro. Paulson, a hedge fund, developed an investment strategy based on the bearish view that 
certain mid-and-sub-prime Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) would experience credit 
events, that is, would default.109 In essence, Paulson believed that synthetic CDOs whose reference 
assets consisted of certain Triple-B rated mid-and-subprime RMBS would experience significant 
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losses and become worthless.110 Paulson then discussed the creation of a CDO with Goldman Sachs 
so as to allow Paulson to participate in selecting a portfolio of reference obligations and then 
effectively short selling the RMBS portfolio it helped to select.111  
 
Goldman Sachs knew it would be difficult to get investors to invest in a CDO that a short investor, 
such as Paulson, had played a significant role in creating. This is because the short investor would 
have the incentive and the opportunity to fill the CDO with RMBS that were likely to default. It is 
highly unlikely that anyone would buy something that someone else had designed to fail. Goldman 
Sachs also knew that the identification of an experienced and independent third party collateral 
manager as having selected the portfolio would facilitate the placement of the CDO (that is, 
encourage investors to invest in it). They knew that they needed to create the impression that an 
independent, neutral collateral manager had chosen the securities in the CDO, rather than someone 
who had effectively taken a bet against that very CDO.  
 
Goldman Sachs therefore sought a collateral manager to play a role in the transaction proposed by 
Paulson.112 They approached the unit bond issuer, ACA Management LLC, to be the collateral 
manager, with the intention of using ACA’s strong brand name and credibility to market the 
transaction to investors, who would be more willing to buy the products if ACA was involved, 
because of the value of ACA’s brand - investors, in effect, trusted ACA’s brand. Goldman Sachs was 
keenly aware of, and wanted to take advantage of, the trust those investors placed in ACA. 
 
                                                          
110
 ibid, 6 
111
 ibid, 6 
112
 ibid, 7 
25 
 
Paulson’s selection criteria for what went into the CDOs favoured RMBS that included a high 
percentage of adjustable rate mortgages, relatively low borrower FICO scores, and a high 
concentration of mortgages in states like Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada that had recently 
experienced high rates of home price appreciation but were likely to suffer price declines in the near 
future. Paulson allegedly loaded the CDO with securities that were likely to fail. 
 
According to the SEC, Goldman Sachs’ marketing materials for the synthetic CDO were false and 
misleading because they represented that ACA selected the reference portfolio while omitting any 
mention that Paulson, a party with economic interests adverse to CDO investors, played a significant 
role in the selection of the reference portfolio.113 The prospectus and other marketing materials 
contained no mention of Paulson, its economic interests in the transaction, or its role in selecting the 
reference portfolio.114 The investors were, in effect, misled into believing that the party selecting the 
portfolio had an “alignment of economic interest” with investors, when in actual fact the opposite 
was the case.  
 
According to the SEC, Goldman Sachs also misled ACA into believing that Paulson was investing in 
the equity tranche of the synthetic CDO and therefore shared a ‘long’ interest115 with CDO 
investors.116 If ACA had been aware that Paulson was taking a ‘short’ position against the CDO, ACA 
would have been reluctant to allow Paulson to occupy an influential role in the selection of the 
reference portfolio, or ACA would probably not have agreed to take part in the transaction.117 ACA 
had sought clarification in regard to Paulson’s role in the transaction but Goldman Sachs and its 
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employee Fabrice Tourre allegedly misrepresented the facts to ACA.118 It seems that ACA had not 
been careless or negligent- ACA’s belief that Paulson was ‘long’ on the deal was reasonable, given 
the information provided to them by Goldman Sachs and Tourre. Reference in ACA’s written 
approval memorandum to Paulson as “the hedge fund equity investor” confirms that ACA was under 
the misimpression that Paulson had a long position rather than a short position with respect to the 
CDO.119 This misimpression is wholly attributable to the fact that Goldman Sachs and its employee, 
Tourre, allegedly lied to and misled ACA.  
 
(a) The SEC Enforcement Action against Goldman Sachs and Fabrice Tourre 
The SEC has taken a successful enforcement action against Goldman Sachs and Fabrice Tourre. The 
first claim made by the SEC was that Goldman Sachs and Tourre knowingly, recklessly or negligently 
misrepresented, in the ABACUS marketing material, that the reference portfolio was selected by ACA 
without disclosing Paulson’s role in the selection and, in addition, misled ACA into believing that 
Paulson was investing in the equity tranche of the CDO when in reality it was not.120 This is contrary 
to section 17 of the Securities Act 1933.121 The second claim was almost identical to the first one, but 
was based on section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934122 and SEC Rule 10b-5.123 The 
distinction between the two claims is that the first claim merely requires the SEC to prove negligence 
on the part of the accused, a lower threshold for establishing culpability, while the second claim 
requires it to prove scienter, that is, the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.124 Goldman Sachs 
agreed to settle the charges against it for $550 million. The settlement allowed Goldman Sachs to 
pay the fine without admitting or denying the allegations of fraud that had been levelled against it, 
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nor did it compel the resignation of any Goldman Sachs officers or employees.125 Instead, Goldman 
Sachs admitted that the incomplete and inadequate disclosures in its marketing materials were a 
mistake.126 It has been argued that the SEC’s use of section 17 allowed Goldman Sachs to admit to 
negligence rather than fraud.127 Regardless of whether or not Goldman Sachs admitted to this, there 
is clearly a basis for an argument that its actions had a negative effect on trust in the financial 
markets. 
 
(b) The Issue of Disclosure and Information Asymmetry 
Disclosure is a key issue that underpinned the prosecution’s case in regard to the above transaction.  
The inadequate disclosure of information can sometimes constitute a significant market failure that 
has often created a good justification for imposing enhanced regulation.128  Disclosure is a key 
weapon in the battle against fraud and market abuse, and is often the cornerstone of investor 
protection regimes in securities markets.129 The US New Deal securities statutes, for example, were 
enacted after the Great Depression largely to address the glaring need for adequate disclosure in the 
US securities markets.130 If the ABACUS transaction had been carried out on a registered Exchange, 
Goldman Sachs would have had to disclose information that ACA, IKB and ABN were not given. It 
has, however, been argued that although the ABACUS transaction was a specially structured deal, it 
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nevertheless required a level of disclosure and transparency that was higher than what might be 
required in a simple bond sale or equity purchase.131  
 
The counter-argument that could be put forward by Goldman Sachs and its supporters is one based 
on libertarian free market ideology. The argument is that ACA and the investors, IKB and ABN, did 
not need disclosure or any other regulatory protection beyond their remedies for breach of contract 
since they were professional institutional investors or market counterparties, who ought to have 
properly examined the contents of ABACUS before investing in or becoming affiliated with 
ABACUS.132 Market counterparties are clients who are able to look after their own interests, thus not 
requiring the protection afforded by regulatory rules.133 There is some support for this view in UK 
law, where the courts are reluctant to interfere in transactions between commercial organisations 
dealing with each other as principals.134 In this sense trust is not seen as being important to 
professional or institutional investors who can reasonably be expected to undertake proper due 
diligence rather than rely on trust. 
 
The argument, by Goldman Sachs and its supporters, that ACA, IKB and ABN were all professional 
institutional investors is, however, a weak one.   US courts have held that the anti-fraud provisions of 
the Securities Acts do not distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, since 
both are entitled to the protection afforded by disclosure and anti-fraud laws.135 Disclosure of 
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relevant information to investors and potential investors is desirable for both economic136 and 
ethical reasons.137 The failure of Goldman Sachs to provide the requisite information for the ABACUS 
investors ultimately led to those investors being misled.138 Misleading investors in this way seriously 
undermines the possibility that cooperation and trust can enhance business performance or 
promote dynamic efficiency within markets. This shows that even sophisticated professional 
investors may have to rely on trust since there are limits to the amount of due diligence that they 
can perform, and trust therefore has a role to play in filling information gaps and helping even the 
most sophisticated professional investors to reduce their information-gathering and information-
processing costs. It further strengthens the argument that trust can encourage more mutually 
beneficial behaviour. 
 
(c) The Issue of Conflict of Interest 
Goldman Sachs has been described as helping some clients to make huge bets against the very same 
mortgage-backed assets that it was selling to other clients,139 and as having failed to disclose this 
conflict of interest to investors.140 Conflicts of interest are problematic for both economic141 and 
ethical reasons.142 The Wall Street analyst case, where Merrill Lynch was punished for its use of 
implicit promises of favourable ratings from its research analysts in exchange for investment banking 
business such as IPO underwriting, provides a good example of disciplinary action taken against a 
firm for failing to properly manage conflicts of interest.143 The former Attorney-General of New York, 
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Eliot Spitzer, took out a successful action against Merrill Lynch for its failure to properly manage 
conflicts of interest when its investment bank put pressure on its research analysts to publicly 
recommend stocks for investors to purchase even though privately the analysts knew that these 
stocks were of poor quality.144 In addition, a subsequent joint investigation by Spitzer, the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and North American 
Securities Administrators Administration (NASAA) into research analysts and their conflicts of 
interest, resulted in a settlement in which ten Wall Street firms and two individuals agreed to pay a 
total of approximately $1.4 billion and to improve their policies and procedures so as to avoid 
conflicts of interest in the future.145 The comment by Spitzer that Merrill Lynch’s behaviour was “a 
shocking betrayal of trust by one of Wall Street’s most trusted names” provides strong support for 
the argument that failing to properly manage conflicts of interest can have a detrimental effect on 
trust in the financial markets.146 
 
Goldman Sachs’ defence to the accusation that it failed to manage conflicts of interest properly is 
rooted in the libertarian free market view that there will inevitably be winners and losers in a free 
market. Goldman Sachs defiantly countered accusations of conflict of interest or betting against its 
clients, arguing that although it “went short” on the housing market while simultaneously continuing 
to trade mortgage-backed securities to its clients, this was not wrong, and was merely a case of 
various sophisticated investors simply taking different views.147 There is some support for this view- 
the arm of Goldman Sachs that sold mortgage-backed securities was not a financial advisory 
business, counselling clients on what might be in their best interests.   Instead, it is arguably a 
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market-making division where customers come forward with things they want to buy or sell and 
Goldman Sachs shops around to find a party willing to be on the other side of the deal.148 The whole 
point of markets is that buyers are taking the opposite view from sellers- there would not be any 
sellers if everyone expected a security to only increase in value.149 
 
Although Goldman Sachs would take the view that it is not unlawful to bet against your clients, such 
an action is arguably inherently unfair and unethical. Indeed, other industry insiders have 
condemned such actions - it has been described as a “reputation issue” that should not have arisen 
if Goldman Sachs held on to its “moral compass”.150 This contributes to the idea that failing to 
behave morally or ethically is tantamount to a failure of trust, even where it is not technically a 
breach of the law. A competitor of Goldman Sachs had actually declined to take part in such a 
transaction because it did not think it should “sell deals that someone was shorting on the other 
side”.151 The fact that even traders and industry professionals who knew and understood the nature 
of the product acknowledged that such behaviour was immoral and unethical shows that such action 
would be a failure of trust that would tarnish the reputations of those who acted in this way.     
 
(d) Trust  
 In many ways, the behaviour of Goldman Sachs with regard to the ABACUS transaction constitutes a   
breach of popular conceptions of trust. It has been observed that properly-functioning markets are 
built on trust, transparency, confidence and certainty, and that these key foundations are severely 
eroded when prominent financial institutions engage in abuses of trust or otherwise act immorally 
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or unethically.152 Stewart Macaulay has argued that it is acceptable for some to do better than 
others when they play by the rules of the game, but unacceptable if those who come out on top 
achieve this by tricking others and having their deceptions supported by the legal system.153 Such 
deceptions undermine trust and, in so doing, reduce the instrumental role that trust plays in 
enhancing business performance. 
 
There is some evidence that the ABACUS deal has had a negative impact on how Goldman Sachs is 
regarded. A recent opinion poll, by CNBC, shows that a large percentage of Americans now have an 
unfavourable opinion of Goldman Sachs in light of the ABACUS controversy.154 Moreover, a recent 
Bloomberg news survey also showed that the public no longer trusted Goldman Sachs and that its 
reputation had been tarnished by the ABACUS scandal.155 This loss in public trust may drive away 
current and future clients, as has already been evidenced by the decision of some European nations 
to stop doing business with Goldman Sachs in the light of its role in the recent Greek sovereign debt 
crisis.156 In sum, the ABACUS transaction demonstrates that although trust might not be as critical to 
professional or institutional investors as it is for retail investors, it nevertheless has a significant role 
to play in regulating the manner in which such professional or institutional investors interact with 
one another in the financial markets. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This article has looked at trust and its significance in commercial relationships. In particular it has 
examined the important role that trust plays in intra-firm and inter-firm relationships, as well as why 
it is necessary to have trust in financial markets. It has also looked at ethical issues where corporate 
or commercial conduct might not constitute a breach of the law, but nevertheless constitutes a 
breach of popular notions or conceptions of trust. In so doing, it highlights the potential that trust 
has to shape regulatory policy for financial markets.  
 
It is clear that important components of financial markets, such as liquidity and investor confidence, 
are to a large extent based on trust. To this extent, financial markets will eventually be weakened if 
trust is eroded within them. The failure of Northern Rock, during the GFC, serves as a stark 
illustration of why trust is important in financial markets. The erosion of trust in the inter-bank and 
capital markets made it difficult for Northern Rock to raise finance through the sale of ABCP. In 
addition, the depositor run that Northern Rock suffered shows that trust is important in retail 
banking in much the same way as it is important in wholesale capital markets. 
 
At the intra-firm level, agency problems and creative accounting remain fundamental issues that 
must be addressed in order to promote trust. The use of esoteric accounting treatments is 
problematic because it helps managements conceal important information from shareholders, such 
as shortcomings in corporate performance. Such accounting treatments therefore exacerbate the 
agency problem rather than reduce it. The use of esoteric accounting treatments is also problematic 
because it allows managements to operate on the fringes of the law rather than firmly within its 
boundaries. Creative accounting is also problematic because it reduces trust once it has been 
discovered. The collapse of Lehman highlighted the need to address these fundamental issues. 
34 
 
Measures that can reduce creative accounting include a more robust, principles-based approach to 
financial and accounting regulation on one hand, and, on the other hand, a shift of focus from 
technical compliance to substantive compliance with the intent or the objectives of the accounting 
laws or principles.157  It is therefore important that such measures are taken in order to tackle the 
problem of creative accounting.  
 
At the inter-firm level, the ABACUS transaction carried out by Goldman Sachs illustrates the need for 
market participants to act conscientiously. Although markets operate on the basis that market 
participants are free to take divergent views on the desirability of their investments the market has 
to guarantee that they will be able to make their decisions based on all of the relevant information. 
Commercial or business relationships are underpinned by contractual relationships which involve or 
ought to involve overarching obligations of good faith, solidarity, role integrity and mutuality.158  The 
integrity of markets therefore depends, to a large extent, on market participants being truthful, 
open and honest with each other.  The deliberate withholding, or non-disclosure, of essential 
information that is required by market participants to make informed decisions, will be a failure of 
trust that undermines the integrity of markets. 
 
Both the Lehman collapse and the ABACUS transaction carried out by Goldman Sachs illustrate some 
of the problems that arise with regard to the development of regulatory policy for dealing with 
financial market failures. Lehman’s use of creative accounting and Goldman Sachs’ acting 
opportunistically with regard to the ABACUS transaction might not necessarily constitute clear 
breaches of the law, but nevertheless constitute clear breaches of popular conceptions of trust. They 
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therefore highlight the fact that law and regulatory policy will have to place greater emphasis on 
complying with the spirit or intent of the law or rules in addition to complying with the wording of 
the law or the rules. They also highlight the fact that ethics and integrity have a greater role to play 
in financial markets and should be used to complement the law and the regulatory rules. Trust can 
therefore play a significant role in regulatory policy because it can be used to emphasize the 
importance not just of complying with laws but also of complying with ethical standards even if such 
standards have not been fully defined in the law.  
 
Corporate law theory clearly needs to be enriched by resort to a greater range of concepts to help us 
to provide a more nuanced understanding of corporations and the financial markets in which they 
operate.  The concept of trust is clearly a useful one in this regard.  This article has argued that the 
concept of trust provides us with essential insights into conduct and transactions that are to be 
found in financial markets.  More applications of this concept and similarly important ideas which 
explain market conduct by individual investors and corporations are appropriate. 
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